These words are spoken by a character in Iris Murdoch's novel, A Fairly Honourable Defeat. She is criticizing Tallis Browne, a man of almost saintly good intentions who is (until the climax of the book) notably ineffective in getting anything done. What are we to make of the ineffi ciency of this otherwise virtuous man? Perhaps it is, as the quote above suggests, a moral failing; perhaps effi ciency should be seen as an ethical virtue Tallis lacks. But the novel complicates the point. For its anti-hero, Julius King, is a model of effi ciency, in the pursuit of nasty ends. The plot is a sort of melodrama, built around his decision to destroy the marriage of his friends. He has no particular reason for this; it is simply to prove that it can be done. But he pursues his goal with a relentless (and often darkly comic) skill, alert to the moral vanity and suspicion of his prey, and quite without mercy. When he is done, the marriage is in ruins-the husband abandoned and fi nally drowned, his wife bereft. King is magnetic and disturbing throughout, callous but compelling, and a kind of genius in the matching of means to ends. The novel taunts us with the question: can effi ciency be a virtue in Julius King?
This paper is about the peculiar ethics of means-end effi ciency. It can present itself as an aspect of good character, so that its absence is a defect in Tallis Browne. But it does not always do so. It is tempting to say about the effi ciency of the nasty person what Kant says about the "coolness of a scoundrel," that it "makes him not only far more dangerous but also immediately more abominable in our eyes" (Kant 1785, Ak. 4: 394) . When Aristotle writes about cleverness (deinotes), "which is such as to be able to do the actions that tend to promote whatever end is assumed and to attain them," he takes the middle ground: " [if] , then, the goal is fi ne, cleverness is praiseworthy, and if the goal is base, cleverness is unscrupulousness."
1 But is this right? After all, there is another kind of middle ground. We might argue, against the Aristotelian view, that effi ciency in itself is neither good nor bad. It is valuable as a means, not as a virtue or a vice.
Questions about the ethics of effi ciency have not been much discussed. Aristotle says nothing, or almost nothing, to defend his claims about it (assuming that effi ciency and cleverness are more or less the same). But the issue is important, not only for its own sake, but for the central place that effi ciency has in the philosophy of practical reason. What is often thought of as the dominant or orthodox view-the "neo-Humean" conception of practical reason as purely instrumental-identifi es practical rationality (or responsiveness to reasons) with means-end effi ciency.
What follows is an argument against effi ciency, as conceived by the instrumentalist. In being indifferent to the moral quality of our ends, effi ciency not only makes the nasty person worse, but is a defect of character, in general. Since practical rationality (or responsiveness to reasons) cannot be a defect of character, instrumentalism about practical reason is false.
Before I present this argument, a word or two about its origins. This paper was inspired in part by Warren Quinn's remarkable essay, "Rationality and the Human Good" (1992) . He argues that effi ciency (what he calls "neoHumean rationality") is a nasty quality, in that it "would recommend a nasty choice" (in the appropriate circumstance), and therefore cannot be identifi ed with "human reason at its most excellent" (Quinn 1992: 220) . I am arguing for the same conclusion, in something like the same way. But our arguments are crucially different. His depends on a dubious personifi cation of practical reason as an inner advisor (Quinn 1992: 215-216) , and on a controversial picture of its "normative authority," in which practical rationality is seen as "the excellence of human beings qua agents." (Quinn 1992: 213) In her recent defence of Quinn's argument, Philippa Foot refers to this premise as "our taken-for-granted, barely noticed assumption that practical rationality has the status of a kind of master virtue" (Foot 2001: 62) , so that it cannot be identifi ed with mere effi ciency. The problem is that Foot's assumption (on behalf of Quinn) begs the question against the instrumentalist, who will simply deny it. For the "neo-Humean," practical rationality (as effi ciency) is not the excellence of human beings qua agents, or a kind of "master virtue"; it is at most one virtue among others. This is perfectly clear in Bernard Williams's classic expression of the "neo-Humean" view:
There are of course many things that a speaker may say to one who is not disposed to f when the speaker thinks that he should be, as that he is inconsiderate, or cruel, or selfi sh, or imprudent; or that things, and he, would be a lot nicer if he were so motivated. . . . But one who makes a great deal out of putting the criticism [in terms of a failure to respond to reasons] seems concerned to say that what is particularly wrong with the agent is that he is irrational. (Williams 1980: 110) Part of Williams's point in this passage is to contrast the particular excellence of practical reason with the other virtues of character. Even if practical reason has "normative authority" in determining what we should do, all things considered, it is not a master virtue-something that, all by itself, will make our character good. This makes it diffi cult to see how Quinn's argument (as Foot interprets it) can work. The argument that follows does not assume that practical reason is a master virtue, only that it is not a defect of character, defect of character, defect or a vice.
I
In the present context, "effi ciency" is a term of art: it is the disposition to be motivated towards the satisfaction of one's fi nal desires. (The reference to fi nal desires here must be read de dicto, not de re: the effi cient person has a general disposition to act so as to satisfy her desires, whatever they are, not just a disposition, with respect to her present array of fi nal desires, to satisfy them.) This disposition is distinct from, and broader than, the tendency to conform to Kant's hypothetical imperative (Kant 1785, 4: 414-417) . His requirement is to will the necessary means to the ends that one intends to bring about. It does not apply to less-than-necessary means, or to desires on which one does not (yet) intend to act. Nor does it deal with partial belief, if it mentions beliefs at all. It is therefore silent about the balancing of desires and probabilities in practical reasoning, and about the best way to achieve a plurality of potentially confl icting ends. By contrast, it is part of being effi cient that one aim at the satisfaceffi cient that one aim at the satisfaceffi cient tion of one's fi nal desires, taken together, and balanced against one another. An adequate theory of effi ciency, and thus an adequate expression of instrumentalism, would have to incorporate a story about this, an account of the proper trade-offs among desires one cannot be sure of satisfying all at once. 2 This is not the only respect in which the instrumentalist's conception of practical reason as effi ciency is richer than we might suppose. For instance, we should allow for an extended or inclusive concept of means, one that covers both productive and constitutive means to an end. The notion of a productive means is that of an effi cient cause. A constitutive means is one that is an instance of, or part of, the relevant end. Thus, moving the brush against the canvas is a constitutive means to painting, in that it is an instance of painting; putting on my socks is a constitutive means to getting dressed, in that it is part of getting dressed. By way of a theory of balancing and by making room for the broader notion of a means, the instrumentalist can accommodate at least some cases of deliberation by imaginative "specifi cation," as when I try to fi gure out not what would cause but what would be a fun holiday, or a satisfying profession. 3 In each of these cases, effi ciency can be understood as the disposition that governs the transition to new desires, ones that aim at the best causal or constitutive means to the overall satisfaction of one's fi nal desires. 4 It is thus a kind of motivating state: not just a matter of knowing the means to one's ends, but of being motivated to take them. This is consistent with the common instrumentalist refrain that reason is motivationally inert, since the role of effi ciency is merely to transmit motivation from one's fi nal desires to desires for the means to their satisfaction: it is not an original source of motivation. This original source of motivation. This original picture of effi ciency as a motivating trait is essential to the instrumentalist view; one would not be "instrumentally rational" if one merely knew, in a detached way, how to achieve one's ends, but had no tendency to do so.
II
We can begin to see the problem with effi ciency by asking an obvious question: how can one criticize effi ciency without praising those who are ineffi cient? Understood as praise for its opposite, the claim that efficiency is a defect of character sounds patently absurd. But this ignores a crucial distinction. In section I, effi ciency was defi ned as the disposition to be moved towards the satisfaction of one's fi nal desires. The reference to "fi nal desires" here must be read de dicto, not de re: the effi cient person has a general disposition to act so as to satisfy her desires, whatever they are, not just a disposition, with respect to her present array of fi nal desires, to satisfy them. This distinction is an instance of a broader contrast, between what we may call "general effi ciency," which applies itself to any fi nal desire an agent happens to acquire, and "specifi c effi ciency" by which an agent is effi cient only with respect to some desires-this particular set of desires, for instance, or desires with a certain content, or a certain moral character. It is general efgeneral efgeneral fi ciency that counts as a vice, or a defect of character, and one may criticize it without advocating ineffi ciency, as such.
It is hard to deny that the fully virtuous person must be specifi cally effi cient, with respect to morally permissible desires. (That is why there is something wrong with Tallis Browne.) But once we make the distinction in the previous paragraph, we have room to deny that she is generally effi cient. And when this possibility is made clear, it ought to seem compelling. A fully virtuous person is not generally effi cient because she is not disposed to give any weight at all to wicked any weight at all to wicked any weight at all desires, in deciding what to do-even if she comes to have them. To adapt an idea from John McDowell (1979), we should think of her as one in whom the deliberative weight of such desires would be silenced altogether, not silenced altogether, not silenced merely outweighed by the presence of other, more virtuous desires.
Some clarifi cations are in order here. The claim is that a fully virtuous person would not be tempted to act on nasty desires, if she act on nasty desires, if she act were to entertain them. She is prone to a kind of deliberative silencing in which such desires are "quarantined"; they do not fi gure in instrumental reasoning, through which she might otherwise aim at the means to their ends. This conception of silencing, as the failure of a fi nal desire to generate derived desires (for the means to its satisfaction) is theoretically modest. It does not depend on McDowell's (1979) explanation of silencing, in terms of the knowledge that constitutes ethical virtue. Nor does it rely on his examples of silencing, which are sometimes controversial. For a courageous person facing danger, he claims, "the risk to life and limb is not seen as any reason for removing himself." (McDowell 1979 : 56) That may not be so. The point we need is restricted to the role of desires in practical deliberation, and to the specifi c case at hand: we rightly consider it an aspect of virtue not be moved by the nasty impulses and base temptations that we sometimes have. They are not to be balanced along with other ends, but to be disregarded altogether. That is why the ethically virtuous person cannot be generally effi cient.
This argument may be strengthened by considering two possible objections. First, one might insist that general effi ciency is compatible with virtue, after all, because the fully virtuous person would not have, or be disposed to have, such nasty desires. It is thus irrelevant how she is disposed to deal with them. But this argument rests on a mistake. It may be impossible for someone to count as fully virtuous while having nasty desires, and in that sense impossible for a virtuous person to have them. But it is not impossible for a virtuous person to acquire a defect or a vice, and it is part of good character to respond to this in the right way. This is one respect in which ethical virtue is more than a present disposition to act well. Consider, for instance, the "moral perfectionist," who acts impeccably, but in whom a blemish of character-fi nding himself amused by malicious gossip, say-would trigger a moral collapse. "If I'm going to listen to rumors about others' private lives," the perfectionist thinks, "I might as well lie and cheat and steal whenever it would benefi t me." It is a defect in the perfectionist that he has such a fragile commitment to virtue, that only perfection will do. This is an extreme case, but it illustrates the point. It matters to one's character how one is disposed to respond to moral failure. For those of us who aspire to virtue and fall short, this is the focus of a great deal of moral energy-not just in relation to wrongdoing, but in relation to our thoughts and feelings about ourselves and others. 5 But it is also part of the character of the ethically virtuous person, who is disposed to remain as she is, not only in that she is not disposed to acquire moral defects, but because she would not be corrupted by them. In the case that interests us, she will not form derived desires for the means to nasty ends-even if she comes to have such ends. The defect of general efficiency is that it confl icts with this: it involves the positive disposition to give weight to nasty desires, a disposition that the fully virtuous person does not have. In the generally effi cient person, the deliberative weight of nasty desires can only be outweighed, never silenced, and the silencing of such desires is part of ethical virtue. This way of putting the point may prompt a second objection, that we have ignored the increasingly familiar distinction between dispositions and counterfactuals. The crucial observation here is that the ascription of a disposition to f in C does not entail the corresponding counterfactual claim. For instance, an object may be fragile-disposed to break when struck-without being such that it would break if it were struck, either would break if it were struck, either would because its disposition is "masked" (imagine a fragile glass stuffed with packing materials), or because on being struck it would altered so as to lose its disposition of fragility. 6 In each case, a disposition is reliably prevented from manifesting itself. Similarly, the thought may go, the ascription of general effi ciency, as a disposition to give weight to any desire in practical reasoning, does not entail that one would give weight to just any desire. The would give weight to just any desire. The would disposition may be "masked" or "altered" in the presence of wicked desires, and so reliably prevented from producing desires for the means to wicked ends. Thus effi ciency, understood in dispositional terms, may be consistent with silencing, after all. This objection is undermined by the fact that masking and altering necessarily depend on interference from outside. An object's disposition to f in C cannot be masked or altered by its own dispositions. If an object is disposed to f in C, but would not do so, it must be prevented by something other than its own nature-as the breaking of the fragile glass is prevented by the packing materials inside it. The closest we can get to cases in which one disposition is masked or altered by another disposition of the same object are those in which the dispositions of one part of part of part an object mask or alter those of another part. This is how we should understand Johnston's (1992: 231-232) examples of the surface color of an object (conceived as a disposition to look a certain way) being masked by radiant light from within, or altered by its tendency to change color when viewed (as with a "shy but powerfully intuitive chameleon"). In each case it is crucial that the masked or altered disposition (to look a certain way) belongs to the surface, and the masking or altering that prevents its manifestation is done by (properties of) something else. That does not apply in the present case. The ethically virtuous person would not be moved by nasty desires, and the grounds of this counterfactual lie in her character, and thus in her own dispositions. Since one disposition cannot be masked or altered by another disposition of precisely the same thing, it follows that she is not disposed to give weight to such desires disposed to give weight to such desires disposed (not just that she would not do so), and this confl icts with general effi ciency.
The moral of these arguments is that general effi ciency, if not a vice, is at least a defect of character. It is a trait that the fully virtuous person does not have. How can we then identify it with the best condition of practical reason? It is one thing to deny that practical rationality is a virtue of character, or to insist that it is ethically neutral. It is quite another to propose a view on which it is ethically wrong to be fully responsive to reasons, so that a virtuous person is disposed to reason badly, or not always to reason well, in deciding what to do. Practical rationality must be at least compatible with ethical virtue, as general effi ciency is not. Instrumentalism about practical reason, at least in its unqualifi ed form, is false.
7. I say "in its unqualifi ed form" because the silencing argument does not directly touch the weaker claim that reasons for action are always derived from fi nal desires (see Williams 1989: 35, cited in note 5) . Sliding over the connection between practical reason as a trait of character and particular reasons to act, what the argument shows is that there is no reason to act on one's nasty ends. It is not suffi cient for suffi cient for suffi cient having a reason to do something that doing it would help to satisfy a fi nal desire. It may still be said, however, that this condition is necessary; and in saying this, we preserve the core of the instrumentalist view-its rejection of reasons that are wholly independent of desire. The problem with this qualifi ed view is that, once we accept that practical reason is not morally neutral, a commitment to the derivation of reasons from fi nal desires begins to look ad hoc. I think this problem can be made decisive; but I do not have space to argue for it here.
